Relational Quantum Mechanics by Rovelli, Carlo
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
96
09
00
2v
2 
 2
4 
Fe
b 
19
97
Relational Quantum Mechanics
Carlo Rovelli
Department of Physics and Astronomy, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa 15260, USA
(February 1, 2008)
I suggest that the common unease with taking quantum mechanics as a fundamental description of
nature (the measurement problem) could derive from the use of an incorrect notion, as the unease
with the Lorentz transformations before Einstein derived from the notion of observer-independent
time. I suggest that this incorrect notion that generates the unease with quantum mechanics is
the notion of observer-independent state of a system, or observer-independent values of physical
quantities. I reformulate the problem of the interpretation of quantum mechanics as the problem
of deriving the formalism from a set of simple physical postulates. I consider a reformulation of
quantum mechanics in terms of information theory. All systems are assumed to be equivalent, there
is no observer-observed distinction, and the theory describes only the information that systems have
about each other; nevertheless, the theory is complete.
I. A REFORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM OF
THE INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM
MECHANICS
In this paper, I discuss a novel view of quantum me-
chanics. This point of view is not antagonistic to cur-
rent ones, as the Copenhagen [Heisenberg 1927, Bohr
1935], consistent histories [Griffiths 1984, Griffiths 1996,
Omnes 1988, Gell-Mann and Hartle 1990], many-worlds
[Everett 1957, Wheeler 1957, DeWitt 1970], quantum
event [Huges 1989], many minds [Albert and Lower 1988,
1989, Lockwood 1986, Donald 1990] or modal [Shimony
1969, van Fraassen 1991, Fleming 1992] interpretations,
but rather combines and complements aspects of them.
This paper is based on a critique of a notion generally as-
sumed uncritically. As such, it bears a vague resemblance
with Einstein’s discussion of special relativity, which is
based on the critique of the notion of absolute simul-
taneity. The notion rejected here is the notion of abso-
lute, or observer-independent, state of a system; equiva-
lently, the notion of observer-independent values of phys-
ical quantities. The thesis of the present work is that by
abandoning such a notion (in favor of the weaker notion
of state –and values of physical quantities– relative to
something), quantum mechanics makes much more sense.
This conclusion derives from the observation that the ex-
perimental evidence at the basis of quantum mechanics
forces us to accept that distinct observers give different
descriptions of the same events. From this, I shall argue
that the notion of observer-independent state of a sys-
tem is inadequate to describe the physical world beyond
the h¯→ 0 limit, in the same way in which the notion of
observer-independent time is inadequate to describe the
physical world beyond the c → ∞ limit. I then consider
the possibility of replacing the notion of absolute state
with a notion that refers to the relation between physical
systems.
The motivation for the present work is the common-
place observation that in spite of the 70 years-lapse from
the discovery of quantum mechanics, and in spite of the
variety of approaches developed with the aim of clarify-
ing its content and improving the original formulation,
quantum mechanics still maintains a remarkable level of
obscurity. It is even accused of being unreasonable and
unacceptable, even inconsistent, by world-class physicists
(For example [Newman 1993]). My point of view in this
regard is that quantum mechanics synthesizes most of
what we have learned so far about the physical world:
The issue is thus not to replace or fix it, but rather to
understand what precisely it says about the world; or,
equivalently: what precisely we have learned from expe-
rimental micro-physics.
It is difficult to overcome the sense of unease that
quantum mechanics communicates. The troubling aspect
of the theory assumes different faces within different in-
terpretations, and a complete description of the problem
can only be based on a survey of the solutions proposed.
Here, I do not attempt such a survey; for a classical re-
view see [d’Espagnat 1971], a more modern survey is in
the first chapters of [Albert 1992], or, in compact form,
see [Butterfield 1995]. The unease is expressed, for in-
stance, in the objections the supporters of each interpre-
tation raise against other interpretations. Some of these
objections are perhaps naive or ill-posed, but the fact
that that no interpretation has so far succeeded in con-
vincing the majority of the physicists, indicates, I believe,
that the problem of the interpretation of quantum me-
chanics has not been fully disentangled yet. This unease,
and the variety of interpretations of quantum mechanics
that it has generated is sometimes denoted as the mea-
surement problem. In this paper, I address this problem
and consider a way out.
The paper is based on two ideas:
• That the unease may derive from the use of a con-
cept which is inappropriate to describe the physi-
cal world at the quantum level. I shall argue that
this concept is the concept of observer-independent
state of a system, or, equivalently, the concept of
observer-independent values of physical quantities.
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• That quantum mechanics will cease to look puz-
zling only when we will be able to derive the formal-
ism of the theory from a set of simple physical asser-
tions (“postulates”, “principles”) about the world.
Therefore, we should not try to append a reason-
able interpretation to the quantum mechanics for-
malism, but rather to derive the formalism from a
set of experimentally motivated postulates.
The reasons for exploring such a strategy are illuminated
by an obvious historical precedent: special relativity. I
shall make use of this analogy for explanatory purposes,
in spite of the evident limits of the simile.
Special relativity is a well understood physical theory,
appropriately credited to Einstein’s 1905 celebrated pa-
per. The formal content of special relativity, however,
is coded into the Lorentz transformations, written by
Lorentz, not by Einstein, and before 1905. So, what
was Einstein’s contribution? It was to understand the
physical meaning of the Lorentz transformations. (And
more, but this is what is of interest here). We could say –
admittedly in a provocative manner– that Einstein’s con-
tribution to special relativity has been the interpretation
of the theory, not its formalism: the formalism already
existed.
Lorentz transformations were discussed at the begin-
ning of the century, and their interpretation was de-
bated. In spite of the recognized fact that they repre-
sent an extension of the Galilean group compatible with
Maxwell theory, the Lorentz transformation were per-
ceived as “unreasonable” and “unacceptable as a funda-
mental spacetime symmetry”, even “inconsistent”, before
1905; words that recall nowadays comments on quan-
tum mechanics. The physical interpretation proposed
by Lorentz himself (and defended by Lorentz long af-
ter 1905) was a physical contraction of moving bodies,
caused by a complex and unknown electromagnetic in-
teraction between the atoms of the bodies and the ether.
It was quite an unattractive interpretation, remarkably
similar to certain interpretations of the wave function col-
lapse presently investigated! Einstein’s 1905 paper sud-
denly clarified the matter by pointing out the reason for
the unease in taking Lorentz transformations “seriously”:
the implicit use of a concept (observer-independent time)
inappropriate to describe reality when velocities are high.
Equivalently: a common deep assumption about real-
ity (simultaneity is observer-independent) which is phys-
ically untenable. The unease with the Lorentz transfor-
mations derived from a conceptual scheme in which an
incorrect notion –absolute simultaneity– was assumed,
yielding any sort of paradoxical consequences. Once this
notion was removed the physical interpretation of the
Lorentz transformations stood clear, and special relativ-
ity is now considered rather uncontroversial.
Here I consider the hypothesis that all “paradoxi-
cal” situations associated with quantum mechanics –as
the famous and unfortunate half-dead Schro¨dinger cat
[Schro¨dinger 1935]– may derive from some analogous in-
correct notion that we use in thinking about quantum
mechanics. (Not in using quantum mechanics, since we
seem to have learned to use it in a remarkably effective
way.) The aim of this paper is to hunt for this incorrect
notion, with the hope that by exposing it clearly to pub-
lic contempt, we could free ourselves from the present
unease with our best present theory of motion, and fully
understand what does the theory assert about the world.
Furthermore, Einstein was so persuasive with his in-
terpretation of the Lorentz equations because he did not
append an interpretation to them: rather, he re-derived
them, starting from two postulates with terse physical
content –equivalence of inertial observers and universal-
ity of the speed of light– taken as facts of experience. It
was this re-derivation that unraveled the physical con-
tent of the Lorentz transformations and provided them
a convincing interpretation. I would like to suggest here
that in order to clarify the physical meaning of quantum
mechanics, a similar result should be searched: Finding a
small number of simple statements about nature –which
may perhaps seem contradictory, as the two postulates
of special relativity do– with clear physical content, from
which the formalism of quantum mechanics could be de-
rived. In other words, I have a methodological sugges-
tion for the problem of the interpretation of quantum
mechanics: Finding the set of physical facts from which
the quantum mechanics’s formalism can be derived. To
my knowledge, such a derivation has not been achieved
yet. In this paper, I do not achieve such a result in a sat-
isfactory manner, but I discuss a possible reconstruction
scheme.
The program outlined is thus to do for the formalism
of quantum mechanics what Einstein did for the Lorentz
transformations: i. Find a set of simple assertions about
the world, with clear physical meaning, that we know are
experimentally true (postulates); ii. Analyze these pos-
tulates, and show that from their conjunction it follows
that certain common assumptions about the world are
incorrect; iii. Derive the full formalism of quantum me-
chanics from these postulates. I expect that if this pro-
gram could be completed, we would at long last begin to
agree that we have understood quantum mechanics.
In section 2, I analyze the measurement process as de-
scribed by two distinct observers. This analysis leads
to the main idea: the observer dependence of state and
physical quantities, and to recognize a few key concepts
in terms of which, I would like to suggest, the quantum
mechanical description of reality “makes sense”. Promi-
nent among these is the concept of information [Shannon
1949, Wheeler 1988, 1989, 1992]. In section 3, I switch
from an inductive to a (very mildly) deductive mode, and
put forward a set of notions, and a set of simple phys-
ical statements, from which the formalism of quantum
mechanics can be reconstructed. I denote these state-
ments as postulates, at the risk of misunderstanding: I
do not claim any mathematical nor philosophical rigor,
nor completeness –supplementary assumptions are made
along the way. I am not interested here in a formaliza-
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tion of the subject, but only in better grasping its physics.
Ideas and techniques for the reconstruction are borrowed
from quantum logic research, but motivations and spirit
are different. Finally, in section 4, I discuss the picture
of the physical world that has emerged, and attempt an
evaluation. In particular, I compare the approach I have
developed with some currently popular interpretations of
quantum mechanics, and argue that the differences be-
tween these disappear, if the results presented here are
taken into account.
In order to prevent the reader from channeling his/her
thoughts in the wrong direction, let me anticipate a few
terminological remarks. By using the word “observer”
I do not make any reference to conscious, animate, or
computing, or in any other manner special, system. I
use the word “observer” in the sense in which it is con-
ventionally used in Galilean relativity when we say that
an object has a velocity “with respect to a certain ob-
server”. The observer can be any physical object having
a definite state of motion. For instance, I say that my
hand moves at a velocity v with respect to the lamp on
my table. Velocity is a relational notion (in Galilean as
well as in special relativistic physics), and thus it is al-
ways (explicitly or implicitly) referred to something; it
is traditional to denote this something as the observer,
but it is important in the following discussion to keep
in mind that the observer can be a table lamp. Also, I
use information theory in its information-theory mean-
ing (Shannon): information is a measure of the number
of states in which a system can be –or in which several
systems whose states are physically constrained (corre-
lated) can be. Thus, a pen on my table has information
because it points in this or that direction. We do not
need a human being, a cat, or a computer, to make use
of this notion of information.
II. QUANTUM MECHANICS IS A THEORY
ABOUT INFORMATION
In this section, a preliminary analysis of the process of
measurement is presented, and the main ideas are intro-
duced. Throughout this section, standard quantum me-
chanics and standard interpretation –by which I mean for
instance: formalism and interpretation in [Dirac 1930] or
[Messiah 1958]– are assumed.
A. The third person problem
Consider an observer O (Observer) that makes a mea-
surement on a system S (System). For the moment we
may think of O as a classical macroscopic measuring ap-
paratus, including or not including a human being. As-
sume that the quantity being measured, say q, takes two
values, 1 and 2; and let the states of the system S be de-
scribed by vectors (rays) in a two (complex) dimensional
Hilbert space HS . Let the two eigenstates of the opera-
tor corresponding to the measurement of q be |1〉 and |2〉.
As it is well known: if S is in a generic normalized state
|ψ〉 = α|1〉 + β|2〉, where α and β are complex numbers
and |α|2+ |β|2 = 1, then O can measure either one of the
two values 1 and 2 – with respective probabilities |α|2
and |β|2.
Assume that in a given specific measurement the out-
come of the measurement is 1. From now on, we con-
centrate on describing this specific experiment, which we
denote as E . The system S is affected by the measure-
ment, and at a time t = t2 after the measurement, the
state of the system is |1〉. In the physical sequence of
events E , the states of the system at t1 and t2 are thus
t1 −→ t2
α|1〉+ β|2〉 −→ |1〉 (1)
Let us now consider this same sequence of events E , as
described by a second observer, which we refer to as P . I
shall refer toO as “he” and to P as “she”. P describes the
interacting system formed by S and O. Again, assume
P uses conventional quantum mechanics. Also, assume
that P does not perform any measurement on the S −O
system during the t1−t2 interval, but that she knows the
initial states of both S and O, and is thus able to give
a quantum mechanical description of the set of events E .
She describes the system S by means of the Hilbert space
HS considered above, and O by means of a Hilbert space
HO. The S − O system is then described by the tensor
productHSO = HS⊗HO. As it has become conventional,
let us denote the vector in HO that describes the state of
the observer O at t = t1 (prior to the measurement) as
|init〉. The physical process during which O measures the
quantity q of the system S implies a physical interaction
between O and S. In the process of this interaction, the
state of O changes. If the initial state of S is |1〉 (resp |2〉)
(and the initial state of O is |init〉), then |init〉 evolves
to a state that we denote as |O1〉 (resp |O2〉). Think
of |O1〉 (resp |O2〉) as a state in which “the position of
the hand of a measuring apparatus points towards the
mark ‘1’ (resp ‘2’)”. It is not difficult to construct model
Hamiltonians that produce evolutions of this kind, and
that can be taken as models for the physical interactions
that produce a measurement. Let us consider the actual
case of the experiment E , in which the initial state of S
is |ψ〉 = α|1〉 + β|2〉. The initial full state of the S − O
system is then |ψ〉 ⊗ |init〉 = (α|1〉 + β|2〉) ⊗ |init〉. As
well known, the linearity of quantum mechanics implies
t1 −→ t2
(α|1〉+ β|2〉)⊗ |init〉 −→ α|1〉 ⊗ |O1〉+ β|2〉 ⊗ |O2〉 (2)
Thus, at t = t2 the system S − O is in the state (α|1〉 ⊗
|O1〉+ β|2〉 ⊗ |O2〉). This is the conventional description
of a measurement as a physical process [von Neumann
1932].
I have described an actual physical process E taking
place in a real laboratory. Standard quantum mechanics
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requires us to distinguish system from observer, but it
allows us freedom in drawing the line that distinguishes
the two. In the above analysis this freedom has been
exploited in order to describe the same sequence of phys-
ical events in terms of two different descriptions. In the
first description, equation (1), the line that distinguishes
system from observer is set between S and O. In the sec-
ond, equation (2), between S − O and P . Recall that
we have assumed that P is not making a measurement
on the S−O system; there is no physical interaction be-
tween S − O and P during the t1 − t2 interval. P may
make measurements at a later time t3: if she measures
the value of q on S and the position of the hand on O,
she finds that the two agree, because the first measure-
ment collapses the state into one of the two factors of
(2), leaving the second measurement fully determined to
be the consistent value. Thus, we have two descriptions
of the physical sequence of events E : The description (1)
given by the observer O and the description (2) given by
the observer P . These are two distinct correct descrip-
tions of the same sequence of events E . At time t2, in the
O description, the system S is in the state |1〉 and the
quantity q has value 1. According to the P description,
S is not in the state |1〉 and the hand of the measuring
apparatus does not indicate ‘1’.
Thus, I come to the observation on which the rest of
the paper relies.
Main observation: In quantum mechan-
ics different observers may give different ac-
counts of the same sequence of events.
For a very similar conclusion, see [Zurek 1982] and
[Kochen 1979]. In the rest of the work, I explore the con-
sequences of taking this observation fully into account.
Since this observation is crucial, I now pause to discuss
and refute various objections to the main observation.
The reader who finds the above observation plausible
may skip this rather long list of objections and jump to
section II.C.
B. Objections to the main observation
Objection 1. Whether the account (1) or the account
(2) is correct depends on which kind of system O happens
to be. There are systems that induce the collapse of the
wave function. For instance, if O is macroscopic (1) is
correct, if O is microscopic (2) is correct.
The derivation of (2) does not rely on any assumption
on the systems, but only from the basics of quantum
mechanics (linearity). Therefore a particular O system
yielding (1) instead of (2) via Schro¨dinger evolution must
behave in a way that contradicts the formalism of quan-
tum mechanics as we know it. This implies that O cannot
be described as a genuine quantum system. Namely that
there are special systems that do not obey conventional
quantum mechanics, but are intrinsically classical in that
they produce collapse of the wave functions –or the actu-
alization of quantities’ values. This idea underlies a va-
riety of old and recent attempts to unravel the quantum
puzzle. The special systems being for instance gravity
[Penrose 1989], or minds [Albert and Loewer 1988], or
macroscopic systems [Bohr 1949]. If we accept this idea,
we have to separate reality into two kinds of systems:
quantum mechanical systems on the one hand, and spe-
cial systems on the other. Bohr declares explicitly that
we must renounce giving a quantum description of the
classical world [Bohr 1949]. This is echoed in texts as
[Landau and Lifschit 1977]. Wigner pushes this view to
the extreme consequences and distinguishes material sys-
tems (observed) from consciousness (observer) [Wigner
1961]. Here, on the contrary, I wish to assume
Hypothesis 1: All systems are equivalent:
Nothing distinguishes a priori macroscopic
systems from quantum systems. If the ob-
server O can give a quantum description of
the system S, then it is also legitimate for an
observer P to give a quantum description of
the system formed by the observer O.
Of course, I have no proof of hypothesis 1, only plau-
sibility arguments. I am suspicious toward attempts to
introduce special non-quantum and not-yet-understood
new physics, in order to alleviate the strangeness of
quantum mechanics: they look to me very much like
Lorentz’ attempt to postulate a mysterious interac-
tion that Lorentz-contracts physical bodies “for real” –
something that we now see was very much off of the point,
in the light of Einstein’s clarity. Virtually all those views
modify quantum mechanical predictions, in spite of state-
ments of the contrary: if at t2, the state is as in (1),
then P can never detect interference terms between the
two branches in (2), contrary to quantum theory predic-
tions. These discrepancies are likely to be minute, as
shown by the beautiful discovery of the physical mech-
anism of decoherence [Zurek 1981, Joos and Zeh 1985],
which “saves the phenomena”. But they are nevertheless
different from zero, and thus observable (more on this
later). I am inclined to trust that a sophisticated experi-
ment able to detect those minute discrepancies will fully
vindicate quantum mechanics against distortions due to
postulated intrinsic classicality of specific systems. In
any case, the question is experimentally decidable; and
we shall see. Second, I do not like the idea that the
present over-successful theory of motion can only be un-
derstood in terms of its failures yet-to-be-detected. Fi-
nally, I think it is reasonable to remain committed, up to
compelling disproof, to the rule that all physical systems
are equivalent with respect to mechanics: this rule has
proven so successful, that I would not dismiss it as far as
there is another way out.
Objection 2. What the discussion indicates is that the
quantum state is different in the two accounts, but the
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quantum state is a fictitious non-physical mental con-
struction; the physical content of the theory is given by
the outcomes of the measurements.
Indeed, one can take the view that outcomes of mea-
surements are the physical content of the theory, and
the quantum state is a secondary theoretical construc-
tion. This is the way I read [Heisenberg 1927] and
[van Fraassen 1991]. According to this view, anything
in between two measurement outcomes is like the “non-
existing” trajectory of the electron, to use Heisenberg’s
vivid expression, of which there is nothing to say. I am
very sympathetic with this view, which plays an impor-
tant role in section III. This view, however, does not cir-
cumvent the main observation for the following reason.
The account (2) states that there is nothing to be said
about the value of the quantity q of S at time t2: for
P , at t = t2 the quantity q does not have a determined
value. On the other hand, for O, at t = t2, q has value
1. From which the main observation follows again.
Objection 3. As before (only outcomes of measure-
ments are physical), but the truth of the matter is that
P is right and O is wrong.
This is indefensible. Since all physical experiments of
which we know can be seen as instances of the S − O
measurement, this would imply that not a single outcome
of measurement has ever being obtained yet. If so, how
could have we learned quantum theory?
Objection 4. As before (only outcomes of measure-
ments are physical), but the truth of the matter is that
O is right and P is wrong.
If P is wrong, quantum mechanics cannot be applied
to the S−O system (because her account is a straightfor-
ward implementation of textbook quantum mechanics).
Thus this objection predicts discrepancies, so far never
observed, with quantum mechanical predictions, which
include observable interference effects between the two
terms of (2).
Objection 5. As before, but under the assumption that
O is macroscopic. Then interference terms become ex-
tremely small because of decoherence effects. If they are
small enough, they are unobservable, and thus q = 1 be-
comes an absolute property of S, which is true and abso-
lutely determined, albeit unknown to P , who could mea-
sure it anytime, and would not see interference effects.
Strictly speaking this is wrong, because decoherence
depends on which observation P will make. Therefore,
the property q = 1 of S would become an absolute prop-
erty at time t2, or not, according to which subsequent
properties of S the observer P considers. This is the rea-
son for which the idea of exploiting physical decoherence
for the basic interpretation of quantum mechanics prob-
lem has evolved into the consistent histories interpreta-
tions, where probabilities are (consistently) assigned to
histories, and not to single outcomes of measurements
within a history. (See, however, the discussion on the
no-histories slogan in [Butterfield 1995].)
Objection 6. There is no collapse. The description (1)
is not correct, because “the wave function never really
collapses”. The account (2) is the correct one. There are
no values assigned to classical properties of system; there
are only quantum states.
If so, then the observer P cannot measure the value of
the property q either, since (by assumption) there are no
values assigned to classical properties, but only quantum
states; thus the quantity q doesn’t ever have a value. But
we do describe the world in terms of “properties” that the
systems have and values assumed by various quantities,
not in terms of states in Hilbert space. In a description
of the world purely in terms of quantum states, the sys-
tems never have definite properties and I do not see how
to match such a description with any observation. For
a detailed elaboration of this point, which is too often
neglected, but I think is very strong, see [Albert 1992].
Objection 7. There is no collapse. The description
(1) is not correct, because “the wave function never re-
ally collapses”. The account (2) is the correct one. The
values assigned to classical properties are different from
branch to branch.
This is a form of Everett’s view [Everett 1957], which
entails the idea that when we measure the electron’s spin
being up, the electron spin is also and simultaneously
down “in some other branch” –or “world”, hence the
many world denomination of this view. The property of
the electron of having spin up is not absolutely true, but
only true relative to “this” branch. We have a new “pa-
rameter” for expressing contingency: “which branch” is a
new “dimension” of indexicality, in addition to the famil-
iar ones “which time” and “which place”. Thus, the state
of affairs of the example is that, at t2, q has value 1 in one
branch and has value 2 in the other; the two branches be-
ing theoretically described by the two terms in (2). This
is a fascinating idea that has recently been implemented
in a variety of diverse incarnations. Traditionally, the
idea has been discussed in the context of a notion of ap-
paratus, namely a distinguished set of subsystems of the
universe, and a distinguished quantity of such an appara-
tus –the preferred basis. Such a (collection of) preferred
apparatus and preferred basis are needed in order to de-
fine branching, and thus in order to have assignment of
values [Butterfield 1995]; the view has recently branched
into the many mind interpretations, where the distin-
guished subsystems are related to various aspect of the
human brain. (See [Butterfield 1995] for a recent discus-
sion). These versions of Everett’s idea violate hypothesis
1, and thus I am not concerned with them. Alternatively,
there are versions of Everett’s idea that reject the spec-
ification of preferred apparatus and preferred basis, and
in which the branching itself is indexed by an arbitrar-
ily chosen system playing the role of apparatus and an
arbitrarily chosen basis. To my knowledge, the only elab-
orated versions of this view which avoids the difficulties
mentioned in objection 5 have evolved into the histories
formalisms considered below.
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Objection 8. What is absolute and observer indepen-
dent is the probability of a sequence A1, ...An of property
ascriptions (such that the interference terms mentioned
above are extremely small - decoherence); this probability
is independent from the existence of any observer mea-
suring these properties.
This is certainly correct. In fact, this observation is
at the root of the consistent histories (CH) interpreta-
tions of quantum mechanics [Griffiths 1984, 1996, Omnes
1988, Gell-Mann and Hartle 1990]. However, in my un-
derstanding, CH confirms the observation above that dif-
ferent observers give different accounts of the same se-
quence of events, for the following reason. The beauty
of the histories interpretations is the fact that the prob-
ability of a sequence of events in a consistent family of
sequences does not depends on the observer, precisely as
it doesn’t in classical mechanics. One can be content with
this powerful result of the theory and stop here. How-
ever, probabilities depends on the choice of the consistent
family of histories, which is chosen (to avoid misunder-
standing: whether or not a physical occurrence can be as-
signed a probability depends on the family chosen). One
(who?) makes a choice in picking up a family of alter-
native histories in terms of which he chooses to describe
the system. Griffiths has introduced the vivid expression
“framework” to indicate a consistent family of histories
[Griffiths 1996]. There exist funny cases in which one
framework is: “Is the value of the physical quantity Q
equal to 1 at time t, or not?”; and a second framework
is “Is the value of the physical quantity Q equal to 2 at
time t, or not?”, and in each framework the answer is
yes with probability 1! [Kent 1995, Kent and Dowker
1995, Griffiths 1996.] Therefore the description of what
has happened at time t, that we can give on the basis of
a fixed set of data, is: At t, Q was equal to 1, if we ask
whether Q was 1 or not. Or: At t, Q was equal to 2, if we
ask whether Q was 2 or not. There is no contradiction
here (in Copenhagen terms, the same mathematics would
indicate that the outcome depends on which apparatus
is present), but it is difficult to deny that a large major-
ity of physicists still want to understand more about this
strangeness of quantum mechanics. In the Copenhagen
view, the choice that corresponds to the choice between
frameworks is determined by which classical apparatus is
present. Namely, the framework is determined by the in-
teraction of the quantum system with a classical object.
In CH, one claims that property ascription does not need
a classical interaction; the price to pay is that (probabilis-
tic) predictions, rather than being uniquely determined,
are framework dependent. In the example of the previous
section, the observers O and P may choose two distinct
frameworks, and the corresponding two descriptions are
both valid: each one in its own framework. However, ob-
server O does not have the choice of using the framework
that the observer P uses, because he has “seen” q = 1.
After having seen that q = 1, O has no option anymore
of allowing a framework in which q is not 1. The fact
that q = 1 has become one of his “data; and data de-
termine which frameworks are consistent. Therefore, the
two observers O and P have different sets of frameworks
at their disposal for describing the same events, because
they have different data (for the same set of events). The
framework in which (2) makes sense is available to P , but
not to O, because O has data that include that fact that
Q = 1 at t2. What is data for O is not data for P , who
considers the full S − O system: P is still allowed to
choose a framework which does not include the value 1
of q at t2. Once the data are specified, all predictions are
well defined in CH, but the characterization of what may
count as data, and therefore which frameworks are avail-
able, is different for the two observers of the above ex-
ample. Once more, we have that two different observers
give different descriptions of the same set of events: what
is data for O is only a possible choice of framework for
P . I will return on this delicate point in the last section.
In conclusion, it seems to me that whatever view of
quantum theory (consistent with hypothesis 1) one holds,
the main observation is inescapable. I may thus proceed
to the main point of this work.
C. Main discussion
If different observers give different accounts of the same
sequence of events, then each quantum mechanical de-
scription has to be understood as relative to a particular
observer. Thus, a quantum mechanical description of a
certain system (state and/or values of physical quanti-
ties) cannot be taken as an “absolute” (observer inde-
pendent) description of reality, but rather as a formal-
ization, or codification, of properties of a system relative
to a given observer. Quantum mechanics can therefore
be viewed as a theory about the states of systems and
values of physical quantities relative to other systems.
A quantum description of the state of a system S exists
only if some system O (considered as an observer) is ac-
tually “describing” S, or, more precisely, has interacted
with S. The quantum state of a system is always a state
of that system with respect to a certain other system.
More precisely: when we say that a physical quantity
takes the value v, we should always (explicitly or im-
plicitly) qualify this statement as: the physical quantity
takes the value v with respect to the so and so observer.
Thus, in the example considered in section 2.1, q has
value 1 with respect to O, but not with respect to P .
Therefore, I suggest that in quantum mechanics
“state” as well as “value of a variable” –or “outcome of a
measurement–” are relational notions in the same sense
in which velocity is relational in classical mechanics. We
say “the object S has velocity v” meaning “with respect
to a reference object O”. Similarly, I maintain that “the
system is in such a quantum state” or “q = 1” are always
to be understood “with respect to the reference O.” In
quantum mechanics all physical variables are relational,
as is velocity.
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If quantum mechanics describes relative information
only, one could consider the possibility that there is a
deeper underlying theory that describes what happens
“in reality”. This is the thesis of the incompleteness
of quantum mechanics (first suggested in [Born 1926]!).
Examples of hypothetical underlying theories are hidden
variables theories [Bohm 1951, Belifante 1973]. Alter-
natively, the “wave-function-collapse-producing” systems
can be “special” because of some non-yet-understood
physics, which becomes relevant due to large number of
degrees of freedom [Ghirardi Rimini and Weber 1986,
Bell 1987], complexity [Hughes 1989], quantum gravity
[Penrose 1989] or other.
As is well known, there are no indications on physical
grounds that quantum mechanics is incomplete. Indeed,
the practice of quantum mechanics supports the view
that quantum mechanics represents the best we can say
about the world at the present state of experimentation,
and suggests that the structure of the world grasped by
quantum mechanics is deeper, and not shallower, than
the scheme of description of the world of classical me-
chanics. On the other hand, one could consider moti-
vations on metaphysical grounds, in support of the in-
completeness of quantum mechanics. One could argue:
“Since reality has to be real and universal, and the same
for everybody, then a theory in which the description of
reality is observer-dependent is certainly an incomplete
theory”. If such a theory were complete, our concept of
reality would be disturbed.
But the way I reformulated the problem of the inter-
pretation of quantum mechanics in section I. should make
us suspicious and attentive precisely to such kinds of ar-
guments, I believe. Indeed, what we are looking for is
precisely some “wrong general assumption” that we sus-
pect to have, and that could be at the origin of the unease
with quantum mechanics. Thus, I discard the thesis of
the incompleteness of quantum mechanics and assume
Hypothesis 2 (Completeness): Quantum
mechanics provides a complete and self-
consistent scheme of description of the physi-
cal world, appropriate to our present level of
experimental observations.
The conjunction of this hypothesis 2 with the main ob-
servation of section II.A and the discussion above leads
to the following idea:
Quantum mechanics is a theory about the
physical description of physical systems rel-
ative to other systems, and this is a complete
description of the world.
The thesis of this paper is that this conclusion is not
self-contradictory. If this conclusion is valid, then the in-
correct notion at the source of our unease with quantum
theory has been uncovered: it is the notion of true, uni-
versal, observer-independent description of the state of
the world. If the notion of observer-independent descrip-
tion of the world is unphysical, a complete description of
the world is exhausted by the relevant information that
systems have about each other. Namely, there is neither
an absolute state of the system, nor absolute properties
that the system has at a certain time. Physics is fully re-
lational, not just as far as the notions of rest and motion
are considered, but with respect to all physical quantities.
Accounts (1) and (2) of the sequence of events E are both
correct, even if distinct: any time we talk about a state
or property of a system, we have to refer these notions to
a specific observing, or reference system. Thus, I propose
the idea that quantum mechanics indicates that the no-
tion of a universal description of the state of the world,
shared by all observers, is a concept which is physically
untenable, on experimental ground.∗
Thus, the hypothesis on which I base this paper is that
accounts (1) and (2) are both fully correct. They refer to
different observers. I propose to reinterpret every contin-
gent statement about nature (“the electron has spin up”,
“the atom is in the so and so excited state”, the “spring
is compressed”, “the chair is here and not there”) as el-
liptic expressions for relational assertions (“the electron
has spin up with respect to the Stern Gerlac apparatus”
... “the chair is here and not there with respect to my
eyes”, and so on). A general physical theory is a the-
ory about the state that physical systems have, relative
to each other. I explore and elaborate this possibility in
this paper.
D. Relation between descriptions
The multiplication of points of view induced by the
relational notion of state and physical quantities’ values
considered above raises the problem of the relation be-
tween distinct descriptions of the same events. What is
the relation between the value of a variable q relative to
an observer O, and the value of the same variable relative
to a different observer? This problem is subtle. Consider
the example of section II.A. We expect some relation be-
tween the description of the world illustrated in (1) and
in (2).
First of all, one may ask what is the “actual”, “abso-
lute” relation between the description of the world rel-
ative to O and the one relative to P . This is a ques-
∗To counter objections based on instinct alone, it is perhaps
worthwhile recalling the great resistance that the idea of fully
relational notions of “rest” and “motion” encountered at the
beginning of the scientific revolution. I think that quantum
mechanics (and general relativity) could well be in the course
of triggering a –not yet developed– revision of world views
as far reaching as the seventeenth century’s one (on this, see
[Rovelli 1995]).
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tion debated in the context of “perspectival” interpreta-
tions of quantum mechanics. I think that the question
is ill-posed. The absolute state of affairs of the world
is a meaningless notion; asking about the absolute rela-
tion between two descriptions is precisely asking about
such an absolute state of affairs of the world. Therefore
there is no meaning in the “absolute” relation between
the views of different observers. In particular, there is
no way of deducing the view of one from the view of the
other.
Does this mean that there is no relation whatsoever
between views of different observers? Certainly not; it
means that the relation itself must be understood quan-
tum mechanically rather than classically. Namely the
issue of the relation between views must be addressed
within the view of one of the two observers (or of a third
one). In other words, we may investigate the view of the
world of O, as seen by P . Still in other words: the fact
that a certain quantity q has a value with respect to O is
a physical fact; as a physical fact, its being true, or not
true, must be understood as relative to an observer, say
P . Thus, the relation between O’s and P ’s views is not
absolute either, but it can be described in the framework
of, say, P ’s view.
There is an important physical reason behind this fact:
It is possible to compare different views, but the process
of comparison is always a physical interaction, and all
physical interactions are quantum mechanical in nature.
I think that this simple fact is forgotten in most discus-
sions on quantum mechanics, yielding serious conceptual
errors. Suppose a physical quantity q has value with re-
spect to you, as well as with respect to me. Can we
compare these values? Yes we can, by communicating
among us. But communication is a physical interaction
and therefore is quantum mechanical. In particular, it
is intrinsically probabilistic. Therefore you can inquire
about the value of q with respect to me, but this is (in
principle) a quantum measurement as well.
Next, one must distinguish between two different ques-
tions: (i) Does P “know” that S “knows” the value of q?
(ii) Does P know what is the value of q relative to O?
(I know that you know the amount of your salary, but I
do not know what you know about the amount of your
salary).
(i) Can P “know” that O has made a measurement on
S at time t2? The answer is yes. P has a full account
of the events E . Description (2) expresses the fact that
O has measured S. The key observation is that in the
state at t2 in (2), the variables q (with eigenstates |1〉
and |2〉) and the pointer variable (with eigenstates |O1〉
and |O2〉) are correlated. From this fact, P understands
that the pointer variable in O has information about q.
In fact, the state of S −O is the quantum superposition
of two states: in the first, (|1〉 ⊗ |O1〉), S is in the |1〉
state and the hand of the observer is correctly on the ‘1’
mark. In the second, (|2〉 ⊗ |O2〉), S is in the |2〉 state
and the hand of the observer is, correctly again, on the
‘2’ mark. In both cases, the hand of O is on the mark
that correctly represents the state of the system. More
formally, there is an operator M on the Hilbert space
of the S −O system whose physical interpretation is “Is
the pointer correctly correlated to q?” If P measuresM ,
then the outcome of this measurement would be yes with
certainty, when the state of the S−O system is as in (2).
The operator M is given by
M (|1〉 ⊗ |O1〉) = |1〉 ⊗ |O1〉
M (|1〉 ⊗ |O2〉) = 0
M (|2〉 ⊗ |O2〉) = |2〉 ⊗ |O2〉
M (|2〉 ⊗ |O1〉) = 0 (3)
where the eigenvalue 1 means “yes, the hand of O indi-
cates the correct state of S” and the eigenvalue 0 means
“no, the hand of O does not indicate the correct state of
S”. At time t2, the S−O system is in an eigenstate ofM
with eigenvalue 1; therefore P can predict with certainty
that O “knows” the value of q. Thus, it is meaningful to
say that, according to the P description of the events E ,
O “knows” the quantity q of S, or that he “has measured”
the quantity q of S, and the pointer variable embodies
the information.
A side remark is important. In general, the state of
the S−O system will not be an eigenvalue ofM . In par-
ticular, the physical interaction between S and O which
establishes the correlation will take time. Therefore the
correlation between the q variable of S and the pointer
variable of O will be established gradually. Does this
mean that, in P views, the measurement is made “grad-
ually”, namely that, according to P , q will have value
with respect to O only partially? This is a much debated
question: “Half the way through the measurement, has a
measurement being done?”. By realizing that P ’s knowl-
edge about O is also quantum mechanical, we find –I
believe– the solution of the puzzle: If the state of the
S −O system is not an eigenstate of M , then, following
standard quantum mechanics rule, this means that any
eventual attempt of P to verify whether or not a mea-
surement has happened will have outcome “yes” or “no”
with a certain respective probability. In other words:
there is no half-a-measurement; there is probability one-
half that the measurement has been made! We never see
quantum superpositions of physical values, we only see
physical values, but we can predict which one we are go-
ing to see only probabilistically. Similarly, I can say only
probabilistically whether or not a physical quantity has
taken value for you; but I should not say that you “half-
see” a physical quantity! Thus, by representing the fact
that (for P ) “the pointer variable of O has information
about the q variable in S” by means of the operator M
resolves the well- known and formidable problem of defin-
ing the “precise moment” in which the measurement is
performed, or the precise “amount of correlation” needed
for a measurement to be established –see for instance
[Bacciagaluppi and Hemmo 1995]. Such questions are
not classical questions, but quantum mechanical ques-
tions, because whether or not O has measured S is not
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an absolute property of the S −O state, but a quantum
property of the quantum S−O system, that can be inves-
tigated by P , and whose yes/no answers are, in general,
determined only probabilistically. In other words: im-
perfect correlation does not imply no measurement per-
formed, but only a smaller than 1 probability that the
measurement has been completed.
A second remark in this regard is that, due to the
well-known bi-orthogonal decomposition theorem, there
are always correlated variables in any coupled system (in
a pure state). Therefore there is always “some” operator
M for which the S − O system is an eigenstate. Much
emphasis has been given to this fact in the literature. I
do not think this fact is very relevant. Imagine we have
a quantum particle in a box, with a finite probability to
tunnel out of it (say this models a nuclear decay). At
some initial time we describe the state with a wave func-
tion concentrated in the box. At some later time a Geiger
counter detects the particle outside the box, and we de-
scribe the particle as a position eigenstate at the Geiger
counter position. During the time in between, we can
describe the state of the particle by giving the wave form
of its Schro¨dinger wave ψ(x) as it leaks out of the box.
Now, in principle, we know that there is an operator A
in the Hilbert space of the particle such that ψ(x) is an
eigenstate of A. Therefore we know that “some” quantity
is uniquely defined at any moment. But what is the inter-
est of such observation? Very little, I would say. A will
correspond to some totally uninteresting and practically
non measurable quantity. Similarly, given an arbitrary
state of the coupled S − O system, there will always be
a basis in each of the two Hilbert spaces which gives the
bi-orthogonal decomposition, and therefore which defines
anM for which the coupled system is an eigenstate. But
this is of null practical nor theoretical significance. We
are interested in certain self-adjoint operators only, rep-
resenting observables that we know how to measure; for
this same reason, we are only interested in correlations
between certain quantities: the ones we know how to
measure.
The second question P may ask is: (ii.) What is the
outcome of the measurement performed by O? It is im-
portant not to confuse the statement “P knows that O
knows the value of q” with the statement “P knows what
O knows about q”. In general, the observer P does not
know “what is the value of the observable q that O has
measured” (unless α or β in (2) vanish). An observer with
sufficient initial information may predict which variable
the other observer has measured, but not the outcome
of the measurement. Communication of measurements
results is however possible (and fairly common!). P can
measure the outcome of the measurement performed by
O. She can, indeed, measure whether O is in |O1〉, or in
|O2〉.
Notice that there is a consistency condition to be ful-
filled, which is the following: if P knows that O has mea-
sured q, then she measures q, and then she measures what
O has obtained in measuring q (namely she measures the
pointer variable), then consistency requires that the re-
sults obtained by P on the q variable and on the pointer
variable be correlated. Indeed, they are! as was first no-
ticed by von Neumann, and as is clear from (2). Thus,
there is a satisfied consistency requirement in the notion
of relative description discussed. This can be expressed in
terms of standard quantum mechanical language: From
the point of view of the P description:
The fact that the pointer variable in O has
information about S (has measured q) is ex-
pressed by the existence of a correlation be-
tween the q variable of S and the pointer vari-
able of O. The existence of this correlation is
a measurable property of the S −O state.
E. Information
It is time to introduce the main concept in terms of
which I propose to interpret quantum mechanics: infor-
mation.
What is the precise nature of the relation between the
variable q and the system O expressed in the statement
“q = 1 relative to O”? Does this relation have a compre-
hensible physical meaning? Can we analyze it in physical
terms? The answer has emerged in the previous subsec-
tion. Let me recapitulate the main idea: The statement
“q has a value relative to O” refers to the contingent state
of the S − O system. But the contingent state of the
S−O system has no observer-independent meaning. We
can make statements about the state of the S−O system
only provided that we interpret these statements as rela-
tive to a third physical system P . Therefore, it should be
possible to understand what is the physical meaning of
“q has a value relative to O” by considering the descrip-
tion that P gives (or could give) of the S − O system.
This description is not in terms of classical physics, but
in quantum mechanical terms; it is the one given in de-
tail above. The result is that “q has value with respect to
S means that there is a correlation between the variable
q and the pointer variable in O, namely that P is able
to predict that subsequent measurements she will make
on q and on the pointer variable will produce correlated
outcomes.
Correlation is “information” in the sense of informa-
tion theory [Shannon 1949]. If the state of the S − O
system is in an eigenstate of M with eigenvalue 1, then
the four possible configurations that the q variable and
the pointer variable can take are reduced to two. There-
fore (by definition) the pointer variable has information
about q. Let me then take a lexical move. I will from
now on express the fact that q has a certain value with
respect to O by saying: O has the “information” that
q = 1.
The notion of information I employ here should not
be confused with other notions of information used in
other contexts. I use here a notion of information that
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does not require distinction between human and non-
human observers, systems that understand meaning or
don’t, very-complicated or simple systems, and so on.
As it is well known, the problem of defining such a no-
tion was brilliantly solved by Shannon: in the technical
sense of information-theory, the amount of information
is the number of the elements of a set of alternatives out
of which a configuration is chosen. Information expresses
the fact that a system is in a certain configuration, which
is correlated to the configuration of another system (in-
formation source). The relation between this notion of
information and more elaborate notions of information is
given by the fact that the information-theoretical infor-
mation is a minimal condition for more elaborate notions.
In a physical theory it is sufficient to deal with this ba-
sic information-theoretical notion of information. This is
very weak; it does not require us to consider information
storage, thermodynamics, complex systems, meaning, or
anything of the sort. In particular: (i.) information can
be lost dynamically (correlated state may become uncor-
related); (ii.) we do not distinguish between correlation
obtained on purpose and accidental correlation; Most im-
portant: (iii.) any physical system may contain informa-
tion about another physical system. For instance if we
have two spin-1/2 particles that have the same value of
the spin in the same direction, we say that one has in-
formation about the other one. Thus observer system
in this paper is any possible physical system (with more
than one state). If there is any hope of understanding
how a system may behave as observer without renounc-
ing the postulate that all systems are equivalent, then
the same kind of processes –“collapse”– that happens be-
tween an electron and a CERNmachine, may also happen
between an electron and another electron. Observers are
not “physically special systems” in any sense. The rele-
vance of information theory for understanding quantum
physics has been advocated by John Wheeler [Wheeler
1988, 1989, 1992].
Thus, the physical nature of the relation between S
and O expressed in the fact that q has a value relative to
O is captured by the fact that O has information (in the
sense of information theory) about q. By “q has a value
relative to O”, we mean “relative to P , there is a certain
correlation in the S and O states”, or, equivalently, “O
has information about q”.
Notice that this is, in a sense, only a partial answer to
the question formulated at the beginning of this section.
First, it is a quantum mechanical answer, because P ’s
information about the S−O system is probabilistic. Sec-
ond, it is an answer that only shifts the problem by one
step, because the information possessed by O is explained
in terms of the information possessed by P . Thus, the
notion of information I use has a double valence. On the
one hand, I want to weaken all physical statements that
we make: not “the spin is up”, but “we have information
that the spin is up” –which leaves the possibility open
to the fact that somebody other has different informa-
tion. Thus, information indicates the usual ascription of
values to quantities that founds physics, but emphasizes
their relational aspect. On the other hand, this ascription
can be described within the theory itself, as information-
theoretical information, namely correlation. But such a
description, in turn, is quantum mechanical and observer
dependent, because a universal observer-independent de-
scription of the state of affairs of the world does not ex-
ist. Finally, there is a key irreducible distinction between
P ’s knowledge that O has information about q and O’s
knowledge of q. Physics is the theory of the relative infor-
mation that systems have about each other. This infor-
mation exhausts everything we can say about the world.
At this point, the main ideas and concepts have been
formulated. In the next section, I consider a certain num-
ber of postulates expressed in terms of these concepts,
and derive quantum mechanics from these postulates.
III. ON THE RECONSTRUCTION OF
QUANTUM MECHANICS
A. Basic concepts
Physics is concerned with relations between physical
systems. In particular, it is concerned with the descrip-
tion that physical systems give of other physical systems.
Following hypothesis 1, I reject any fundamental distinc-
tions as: system/observer, quantum/ classical system,
physical system/consciousness. Assume that the world
can be decomposed (possibly in a variety of ways) in a
collection of systems, each of which can be equivalently
considered as an observing system or as an observed sys-
tem. A system (observing system) may have information
about another system (observed system). Information
is exchanged via physical interactions. The actual pro-
cess through which information is collected and perhaps
stored is not of particular interest here, but can be phys-
ically described in any specific instance.
Information is a discrete quantity: there is a minimum
amount of information exchangeable (a single bit, or the
information that distinguishes between just two alterna-
tives.) I will denote a process of acquisition of infor-
mation (a measurement) as a “question” that a system
(observing system) asks another system (observed sys-
tem). Since information is discrete, any process of ac-
quisition of information can be decomposed into acqui-
sitions of elementary bits of information. I refer to an
elementary question that collects a single bit of informa-
tion as a “yes/no question”, and I denote these questions
as Q1, Q2, . . ..
Any system S, viewed as an observed system, is char-
acterized by the family of yes/no questions that can be
asked to it. These correspond to the physical variables of
classical mechanics and to the observables of conventional
quantum mechanics. I denote the set of these questions
as W (S) = {Qi, i ∈ I}, where the index i belongs to an
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index set I characteristic of S. The general kinemati-
cal features of S are representable as relations between
the questions Qi in W (S), that is, structures overW (S).
For instance, meaningful questions that can be asked to
an electron are whether the particle is in a certain re-
gion of space, whether its spin along a certain direction
is positive, and so on.
The result of a sequence of questions (Q1, Q2, Q3, . . .)
to S, from an observer system O, can be represented by
a string
(e1, e2, e3, . . .) (4)
where each ei is either 0 or 1 (no or yes) and represents
the response of the system to the question Qi. Thus the
information that O has about S can be represented as a
binary string. It is a basic fact about nature that knowl-
edge of a portion (e1, . . . , en) of this string provides indi-
cations about the subsequent outcomes (en+1, en+2, . . .).
It is in this sense that a string (4) contains the informa-
tion that O has about S.
Trivially repeating the same question (experiment) and
obtaining always the same outcome does not increase the
information on S. The relevant information (from now
on, simply information) that O has about S is defined as
the non-trivial content of the (potentially infinite) string
(4), that is the part of (4) relevant for predicting future
answers of possible future questions. The relevant infor-
mation is the subset of the string (4), obtained discarding
the ei’s that do not affect the outcomes of future ques-
tions.
The relation between the notions introduced and tra-
ditional notions used in quantum mechanics is transpar-
ent: A question is a version of a measurement. The idea
that quantum measurements can be reduced to yes/no
measurements is old. A yes/no measurement is repre-
sented by a projection operator onto a linear subset of the
Hilbert space, or by the linear subset of the Hilbert space
itself. Here this idea is not derived from the quantum
mechanical formalism, but is justified in information-
theoretical terms. The notions of observing system and
observed system reflect the traditional notions of observer
and system (but any system can play both roles here).
W (S) corresponds to the set of the observables. Recall
that in algebraic approaches a system is characterized by
the (algebraic) structure of the family of its observables.
A notion does not appear here: the state of the sys-
tem. The absence of this notion is the prime feature of
the interpretation considered here. In place of the notion
of state, which refers solely to the system, the notion of
the information that a system has about another system
has been introduced. I view this notion very concretely:
a piece of paper on which outcomes of measurements are
written, hands of measuring apparatus, memory of sci-
entists, or a two-value variable which is up or down after
an interaction.
For simplicity, in the following I focus on systems that
in conventional quantum mechanics are described by a
finite dimensional Hilbert space. This choice simplifies
the mathematical treatment of the theory, avoiding con-
tinuum spectrum and other infinitary issues.
B. The two main postulates
Postulate 1 (Limited information). There is
a maximum amount of relevant information
that can be extracted from a system.
The physical meaning of postulate 1 is that it is possible
to exhaust, or give a complete description of the system.
In other words, any future prediction that can be inferred
about the system out of an infinite string (4), can also
be inferred from a finite subset
s = [e1, . . . , eN ] (5)
of (4), where N is a number that characterizes the system
S. The finite string (5) represents the maximal knowl-
edge that O has about S.† One may say that any system
S has a maximal “information capacity” N , where N , an
amount of information, is expressed in bits. This means
that N bits of information exhaust everything we can say
about S. Thus, each system is characterized by a num-
ber N . In terms of traditional notions, we can view N as
the smallest integer such that N ≥ log2 k, where k is the
dimension of the Hilbert space of the system S. Recall
that the outcomes of the measurement of a complete set
of commuting observables, characterizes the state, and
in a system described by a k = 2N dimensional Hilbert
space such measurements distinguish one outcome out
of 2N alternative (the number of orthogonal basis vec-
tors): this means that one gains information N on the
system. Postulate 1 is confirmed by our experience about
the world (within the assumption above, that we restrict
to finite dimensional Hilbert space systems. Generaliza-
tion to infinite systems should not be difficult.)
Notice that postulate 1 already adds the Planck’s con-
stant to classical physics. Consider a classical system de-
scribed by a variable q that takes bounded but continuous
values; for instance, the position of a particle. Classically,
the amount of information we can gather about it is infi-
nite: we can locate its state in the system’s phase space
with arbitrary precision. Quantum mechanically, this in-
finite localization is impossible because of postulate 1.
Thus, maximum available information can localize the
state only within a finite region of the phase space. Since
†The string (5) is essentially the state. The novelty here is
not the fact that the state is defined as the response of the
system to a set of yes/no experiments: this is the traditional
reading of the state as a preparation procedure. The novelty
is that this notion of state is relative to the observer that has
asked the questions.
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the dimensions of the classical phase space of any system
are (L2T−1M)n, there must be a universal constant with
dimension L2T−1M , that determines the minimal local-
izability of objects in phase space. This constant is of
course Planck’s constant. Thus we can view Planck’s
constant just as the transformation coefficient between
physical units (position × momentum) and information
theoretical units (bits).
What happens if, after having asked the N questions
such that the maximal information about S has been
gathered, the system O asks a further question QN+1?
Postulate 2 (Unlimited information). It is
always possible to acquire new information
about a system.
If, after having gathered the maximal information about
S, the system O asks a further question Q, to the ob-
served system S, there are two extreme possibilities: ei-
ther the question Q is fully determined by previous ques-
tions, or not. In the first case, no new information is
gained. However, the second postulate asserts that there
is always a way to acquire new information. This postu-
late implies therefore that the sequence of responses we
obtain from observing a system cannot be fully determin-
istic.
The motivation for the second postulate is fully ex-
perimental. We know that all quantum systems (and all
systems are quantum systems) have the property that
even if we know their quantum state |ψ〉 exactly, we can
still “learn” something new about them by performing
a measurement of a quantity O such that |ψ〉 is not an
eigenstate of O. This is an experimental result about
the world, coded in quantum mechanics. Postulate 2 ex-
presses this result.
Since the amount of information that O can have about
S is limited by postulate 1, when new information is ac-
quired, part of the old relevant-information becomes ir-
relevant. In particular, if a new question Q (not deter-
mined by the previous information gathered), is asked,
then O looses (at least) one bit of the previous infor-
mation. So that, after asking the question Q, new in-
formation is available, but the total amount of relevant
information about the system does not exceed N bits.
Rather surprisingly, those two postulates are (almost)
sufficient to reconstruct the full formalism of quantum
mechanics. Namely, one may assert that the physical
content of the general formalism of quantum mechanics
is (almost) nothing but a sequence of consequences of
two physical facts expressed in postulates 1 and 2. This
is illustrated in the next section.
C. Reconstruction of the formalism, and the third
postulate
In this section, I discuss the possibility of deriving the
formalism of quantum mechanics from the physical as-
sertions contained in the postulates 1 and 2. This sec-
tion is technical, and the uninterested reader may skip
it and jump to section III.D. The technical machinery I
employ has been developed (with different motivations)
in quantum logic analyses. See for example [Beltrametti
and Cassinelli 1981]. As I mentioned in the introduc-
tion, the reconstruction attempt is not fully successful.
I will be forced to introduce a third postulate (besides
various relative minor assumptions). I will speculate on
the possibility of giving this postulate a simple physical
meaning, but I do not have any clear result. This dif-
ficulty reflects parallel difficulties in the quantum logic
reconstruction attempts.
Let me begin by analyzing the consequences of the first
postulate. The number of questions inW (S) can be much
larger than N . Some of these questions may not be in-
dependent. In particular, one may find (experimentally)
that they can be related by implication (Q1 ⇒ Q2), union
(Q3 = Q1∨Q2) and intersection (Q3 = Q1∧Q2). One can
define an always false (Q0) and an always true question
(Q∞), the negation of a question (¬Q), and a notion of
orthogonality as follows: if Q1 ⇒ ¬Q2, then Q1 and Q2
are orthogonal (we indicate this as Q1⊥Q2). Equipped
with these structures, and under the (non-trivial) addi-
tional assumption that ∨ and ∧ are defined for every pair
of questions, W (S) is an orthomodular lattice [Beltram-
etti and Cassinelli 1981, Huges 1989].
If there is a maximal amount of information that can be
extracted from the system, we may assume that one can
select in W (S) an ensemble of N questions Qi, which we
denote as c = {Qi, i = 1, N}, that are independent from
each other. There is nothing canonical in this choice,
so there may be many distinct families c, b, d, ... of N
independent questions inW (S). If a systemO asks theN
questions in the family c to a system S, then the answers
obtained can be represented as a string that we denote
as
sc = [e1, ......, eN ]c (6)
The string sc represents the information thatO has about
S, as a result of the interaction that allowed it to ask the
questions in c. The string sc can take 2
N = K values; we
denote these values as s
(1)
c , s
(2)
c , ..., s
(K)
c . So that
s(1)c = [0, 0, . . . , 0]c
s(2)c = [0, 0, . . . , 1]c
. . . ,
s(K)c = [1, 1, . . . , 1]c (7)
Since the 2N possible outcomes s
(1)
c , s
(2)
c , ..., s
(K)
c of the
N yes/no questions are (by construction) mutually ex-
clusive, we can define 2N new questions Q
(1)
c ...Q
(K)
c such
that the yes answer to Q
(i)
c corresponds to the string of
answers s
(i)
c :
Q(1)c = ¬Q1 ∧ ¬Q2 ∧ .... ∧ ¬QN
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Q(2)c = ¬Q1 ∧ ¬Q2 ∧ .... ∧QN
...
Q(k)c = Q1 ∧Q2 ∧ .... ∧QN (8)
We refer to questions of this kind as “complete ques-
tions”. By taking all possible unions of sets of complete
questions Q
(i)
c (of the same family c), we construct a
Boolean algebra that has Q
(i)
c as atoms.
Alternatively, the observer O could use a different
family of N independent yes-no questions, in order to
gather information about S. Denote an alternative set
as b. Then, he will still have a maximal amount of rel-
evant information about S formed by an N -bit string
sb = [e1, ......, eN ]b. Thus, O can give different kinds of
descriptions of S, by asking different questions. Corre-
spondingly, denote as s
(1)
b ...s
(K)
b the 2
N values that sb
can take, and consider the corresponding complete ques-
tions Q
(1)
b ...Q
(K)
b and the Boolean algebra they generate.
Thus, it follows from the first postulate that the set of
the questions W (S) that can be asked to a system S has
a natural structure of an orthomodular lattice containing
subsets that form Boolean algebras. This is precisely the
algebraic structure formed by the family of the linear sub-
sets of a Hilbert space, which represent the yes/no mea-
surements in ordinary quantum mechanics! [Jauch 1968,
Finkelstein 1969, Piron, 1972, Beltrametti and Cassinelli
1981.]
The next question is the extent to which the infor-
mation (6) about the set of questions c determines the
outcome of an additional question Q. There are two ex-
treme possibilities: that Q is fully determined by (6), or
that it is fully independent, namely that the probabil-
ity of getting a yes answer is 1/2. In addition, there is
a range of intermediate possibilities: The outcome of Q
may be determined probabilistically by sc. The second
postulate states explicitly that there are questions that
are non-determined. Define, in general, as p(Q,Q
(i)
c ) the
probability that a yes answer to Q will follow the string
s
(i)
c . Given two complete families of information sc and
sb, we can then consider the probabilities
‡
pij = p(Q
(i)
b , Q
(j)
c ) (9)
From the way it is defined, the 2N×2N matrix pij cannot
be fully arbitrary. First, we must have
0 ≥ pij ≥ 1 (10)
‡I do not wish to enter here the debate on the meaning of
probability in quantum mechanics. I think that the shift of
perspective I am suggesting is meaningful in the framework
of an objective definition of probability, tied to the notion of
repeated measurements, as well as in the context of subjec-
tive probability, or any variant of this, if one does not accept
Jayne’s criticisms of the last.
Then, if the information s
(j)
c , is available about the sys-
tem, one and only one of the outcomes s
(i)
b , may result.
Therefore
∑
i
pij = 1 (11)
We also assume that p(Q
(i)
b , Q
(j)
c ) = p(Q
(j)
c , Q
(i)
b ) (this is
a new assumption! There is a relation with time reversal,
but I leave it here as an unjustified assumption at this
stage), from which we must have
∑
j
pij = 1 (12)
The conditions (10-11-12) are strong constraints on the
matrix pij . They are satisfied if
pij = |U ij |2 (13)
where U is a unitary matrix, and pij can always be writ-
ten in this form for some unitary matrix U (which, how-
ever, is not fully determined by pij).
Consider a question in the Boolean algebra generated
by a family sc, for instance
Q(jk)c = Q
(j)
c ∨Q
(k)
c (14)
In order to take this question into account, we cannot
consider probabilities of the form p(Q
(i)
b , Q
(jk)
c ), because
a yes answer toQ
(jk)
c is less than the maximum amount of
relevant information. But we may consider probabilities
of the form, say,
pi(jk)i = p(Q
(i)
b , Q
(jk)
c Q
(i)
b ) (15)
defined as the probability that a yes answer to Q
(i)
b will
follow a yes answer to Q
(i)
b (N bits of information) and
a subsequent yes answer to Q
(jk)
c (N − 1 bits of infor-
mation). As is well known, we have (experimentally!)
that
pi(jk)i 6= p(Q
(i)
b , Q
(j)
c ) p(Q
(j)
c , Q
(i)
b )
+p(Qb(i), Q
(k)
c ) p(Q
(k)
c , Q
(i)
b )
= (pij)2 + (pik)2 (16)
Accordingly, we can determine the missing phases of U
in (13) by means of the correct relation, which is
pi(jk)i = |U ijU ji + U ikUki|2 (17)
It would be extremely interesting to study the constraints
that the probabilistic nature of all quantities p implies,
and to investigate to which extent the structure of quan-
tum mechanics can be derived in full from these con-
straints. One could conjecture that eqs.(13-17) could be
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derived solely by the properties of conditional probabili-
ties –or find exactly the weakest formulation of the super-
position principle directly in terms of probabilities: this
would be a strong result. Alternatively, it would be even
more interesting to investigate the extent to which the
noticed consistency between different observers’ descrip-
tions, which I believe characterizes quantum mechanics
so marvelously, could be taken as the missing input for
reconstructing the full formalism. I have a suspicion this
could work, but have no definite result. Here, I con-
tent myself with the more modest step of introducing
a third postulate. For strictly related attempts to re-
construct the quantum mechanical formalism from the
algebraic structure of the measurement outcomes, see
[Mackey 1963, Maczinski 1967, Finkelstein 1969, Jauch
1968, Piron 1972].
Postulate 3 (Superposition principle). If c
and b define two complete families of ques-
tions, then the unitary matrix Ucb in
p(Q(i)c , Q
(j)
b ) = |U
ij
cb |
2 (18)
can be chosen in such a way that for every c,
b and d, we have Ucd = UcbUbd and the effect
of composite questions is given by eq.(17).
It follows that we may consider any question as a vec-
tor in a complex Hilbert space, fix a basis |Q
(i)
c 〉 in this
space and represent any other question |Q
(j)
b 〉 as a linear
combination of these:
|Q
(j)
b 〉 =
∑
i
U
ji
bc |Q
(i)
c 〉 (19)
The matrices U ijbc are then a unitary change of basis from
the |Q
(i)
c 〉 to the |Q
(j)
b 〉 basis. Recall now the conventional
quantum mechanical probability rule: if |v(i)〉 are a set
of basis vectors and |w(j)〉 a second set of basis vectors
related to the first ones by
|w(j)〉 =
∑
i
U ji |v(i)〉 (20)
then the probability of measuring the state |w(j)〉 if the
system is in the state |w(i)〉 is
pij = |〈v(i)|w(j)〉|2 (21)
(20) and (21) yield pij = |U ij |2, which is equation
(18). Therefore the conventional formalism of quan-
tum mechanics as well as the standard probability rules
follow completely from the three postulates. The set
W (S) has the structure of a set of linear subspaces in
the Hilbert space. For any yes/no question Qi, let Li
be the corresponding linear subset of H . The rela-
tions {⇒,∨,∧,¬,⊥} between questions Qi correspond
to the relations {inclusion, orthogonal sum, intersection,
orthogonal-complement, orthogonality} between the cor-
responding linear subspaces Li.
The inclusion of dynamics in the above scheme is
straightforward. Two questions can be considered as dis-
tinct if defined by the same operations but performed
at different times. Thus, any question can be labeled
by the time variable t, indicating the time at which it
is asked: denote as t → Q(t) the one-parameter family
of questions defined by the same procedure performed
at different times. In this way we have naturally the
Heisenberg picture. As we have seen, the set W (S) has
the structure of a set of linear subspaces in the Hilbert
space. Assuming that time evolution is a symmetry in
the theory, the set of all the questions at time t2 must
be isomorphic to the set of all the questions at time t1.
Therefore the corresponding family of linear subspaces
must have the same structure; therefore there should be
a unitary transformation U(t2 − t1) such that
Q(t2) = U(t2 − t1)Q(t1)U
−1(t2 − t1) (22)
By conventional arguments, these unitary matrices form
an abelian group and U(t2 − t1) = exp{−ı(t2 − t1)H},
where H is a self-adjoint operator on the Hilbert space,
the Hamiltonian. The Schro¨dinger equation follows im-
mediately if we transform from the Heisenberg to the
Schro¨dinger picture.
D. The observer observed
We now have the full formal machinery of quantum
mechanics, with an interpretative novelty: the absence of
the notion of state the system. I now return to the issue
of the relation between information of distinct observers.
How can a system P have information about the fact that
O has information about S? The information possessed
by distinct observers cannot be compared directly. This
is the key point of the construction. A statement about
the information possessed by O is a statement about the
physical state of O; the observer O is a regular physi-
cal system. Since there is no absolute meaning to the
state of a system, any statement regarding the state of
O, including the information it possess, is to be referred
to some other system observing O. A second observer P
can have information about the fact that O has informa-
tion about S, but any acquisition of information implies
a physical interaction. P can get new information about
the information that O has about S only by physically
interacting with the S −O system.
At the cost of repeating myself, let me stress again
that I believe that the common mistake in analyzing mea-
surement issues in quantum mechanics is to forget that
two observers can compare their information (their mea-
surement outcomes) only by physically interacting with
each other. This means that there is no way to compare
“the information possessed by O” with ”the information
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possessed by P”, without considering a quantum physi-
cal interaction, or a quantum measurement, between the
two.
The relation between the information possessed by dis-
tinct observers is thus given by the following: Viewed by
O, information about S is the primary concept in terms of
which one describes the world; viewed by P , the informa-
tion that O has about S information is just a property of
some degrees of freedom in O being correlated with some
property of S. This can be taken as an additional ingre-
dient to the structure defined by the three postulates; it
ties the distinct observers to each other.
Again, the direct question “Do observersO and P have
the same information on a system S?” is meaningless,
because it is a question about the absolute state of O
and P . What is meaningful is to rephrase the question
in terms of some observer. For instance, we could ask it in
terms of the information possessed by a further observer,
or by P herself. Consider this last case. At time t1, O
gets information about S. P has information about the
initial state, and therefore has the information that the
measurement has been performed. The meaning of this
is that she knows that the states of the S−O systems are
correlated, or more precisely she knows that if at a later
time t3 she asks a question to S concerning property A,
and a question to O concerning his knowledge about A
(or, equivalently, concerning the position of a pointer),
she will get consistent results.
From the dynamical point of view, knowledge of the
structure of the family of questions W (S) implies the
knowledge of the dynamics of S (because W (S) includes
all Heisenberg observables at all times). In Hilbert space
terms, this means knowing the Hamiltonian of the evo-
lution of the observed system. If P knows the dynamics
of the S − O system, she knows the two Hamiltonians
of O and S and the interaction Hamiltonian. The inter-
action Hamiltonian cannot be vanishing because a mea-
surement (O measuring S) implies an interaction: this is
the only way in which a correlation can be dynamically
established. From the point of view of P , the measure-
ment is therefore a fully unitary evolution, determined
by a peculiar interaction Hamiltonian between O and S.
The interaction is a measurement if it brings the states
(relative P ) to a correlated configuration. On the other
hand, O gives a dynamical description of S alone. There-
fore he can only use the S Hamiltonian. Since between
times t1 and t2 the evolution of S is affected by its inter-
action with O, the description of the unitary evolution of
S given by O breaks down. The unitary evolution does
not break down for mysterious physical quantum jumps,
or due to unknown effects, but simply because O is not
giving a full dynamical description of the interaction. O
cannot have a full description of the interaction of S with
himself (O), because his information is correlation, and
there is no meaning in being correlated with oneself.
The reader may convince himself that even if we take
into account several observers observing each other, there
is no way in which contradiction may develop, provided
that one does not violate the two rules:
• (i) There is no meaning to the state of a system or
the information that a system has, except within
the information of a further observer.
• (ii) There is no way a system P may get information
about a system O without physically interacting
with it, and therefore without breaking down (at
the time of the interaction) the unitary evolution
description of O.
For instance, there is no way two observers P and O can
get information about a system S independently from
each other: one of two (say O) will have to obtain the
information first. In doing so, he will interact with S at
a certain time t. This interaction implies that there is a
non vanishing interaction Hamiltonian between S and O.
If P asks a question to O at a later time t′, she will either
have to consider the interacting correlated S−O system,
or to realize that the unitary evolution of the O dynamics
has broken down, due to the physical interaction she was
not taking into account.
IV. CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPT OF STATE
A. “Any observation requires an observer”:
summary of the ideas presented
Let me summarize the path covered. I started from the
distinction between observer and observed-system. I as-
sumed (hypothesis 1) that all systems are equivalent, so
that any observer can be described by the same physics
as any other system. In particular, I assumed that an
observer that measures a system can be described by
quantum mechanics. I have analyzed a fixed physical
sequence of events E , from two different points of obser-
vations, the one of the observer and the one of a third
system, external to the measurement. I have concluded
that two observers give different accounts of the same
physical set of events (main observation).
Rather than backtracking in front of this observation,
and giving up the commitment to the belief that all sys-
tems are equivalent, I have decided to take this experi-
mental fact at its face value, and consider it as a starting
point for understanding the world. If different observers
give different descriptions of the state of the same sys-
tem, this means that the notion of state is observer de-
pendent . I have taken this deduction seriously, and have
considered a conceptual scheme in which the notion of
absolute observer-independent state of a system is re-
placed by the notion of information about a system that
a physical system may possess.
I have considered three postulates that this informa-
tion must satisfy, which summarize present experimental
evidence about the world. The first limits the amount
of relevant information that a system can have; the sec-
ond summarizes the novelty revealed by the experiments
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from which quantum mechanics derives, by asserting that
whatever the information we have about a system we
can always get new information. The third limits the
structure of the set of questions; this third postulate can
probably be sharpened. Out of these postulates the con-
ventional Hilbert space formalism of quantum mechanics
and the corresponding rules for calculating probabilities
(and therefore any other equivalent formalism) can be
rederived.
A physical system is characterized by the structure
on the set W (S) of questions that can be asked to the
system. This set has the structure of the non-Boolean
algebra of a family of linear subspaces of a complex k-
dimensional Hilbert space. The information about S that
any observer O can possess can be represented as a string
s, containing an amount of information N .
I have investigated the meaning of this information out
of which the theory is constructed. I have shown that the
fact that a variable in a systemO has information about a
variable in a system S means that the variables of S and
O are correlated, meaning that a third observer P has
information about the coupled S −O system that allows
her to predict correlated outcomes between questions to
S and questions to O. Thus correlation has no absolute
meaning, because states have no absolute meaning, and
must be interpreted as the content of the information
that a third system has about the S −O couple.
Finally, since we take quantum mechanics as a com-
plete description of the world at the present level of ex-
perimental knowledge (hypothesis 2), we are forced to
accept the result that there is no objective, or more pre-
cisely observer-independent meaning to the ascription of
a property to a system. Thus, the properties of the sys-
tems are to be described by an interrelated net of ob-
servations and information collected from observations.
Any complex situation can be described in toto by a fur-
ther additional observer, and the interrelation is consis-
tent. However, such in toto description is deficient in
two directions: upward, because an even more general
observer is needed to describe the global observer itself,
and –more importantly– downward, because the in toto
observer knows the content of the information that the
single component systems possess about each other only
probabilistically.
There is no way to “exit” from the observer-observed
global system: “Any observation requires an observer”
(The expression is freely taken from [Maturana and
Varela 1920]). In other words, I suggest that it is a mat-
ter of natural science whether or not the descriptions that
different observers give of the same ensemble of events is
universal or not:
Quantum mechanics is the theoretical formal-
ization of the experimental discovery that the
descriptions that different observers give of
the same events are not universal.
The concept that quantum mechanics forces us to give
up is the concept of a description of a system independent
from the observer providing such a description; that is,
the concept of absolute state of a system. The structure
of the classical scientific description of the world in terms
of systems that are in certain states is perhaps incorrect,
and inappropriate to describe the world beyond the h¯→
0 limit.
B. Relation with other interpretations
I conclude with a brief discussion on the relation be-
tween the view presented here and some popular views
of quantum mechanics. I follow [Butterfield 1995] to or-
ganize current strategies on the quantum puzzle. The
first strategy (Dynamics) is to reject the quantum postu-
late that an isolated system evolves according to the lin-
ear Schro¨dinger equation, and consider additional mech-
anisms that modify this evolution –in a sense physically
producing the wave function collapse. Examples are the
interpretations in which the measurement process is re-
placed by some hypothetical process that violates the
linear Schro¨dinger equation [Ghirardi Rimini and Weber
1986, Penrose 1989]. These interpretation are radically
different from the present approach, since they violate hy-
pothesis 2. My effort here is not to modify quantum me-
chanics to make it consistent with my view of the world,
but to modify my view of the world to make it consistent
with quantum mechanics.§
The second and third strategies maintain the idea that
probabilistic expectations of values of any isolated physi-
cal system are given by the linear Schro¨dinger evolution.
They must then face the problem of reconciling (in the
example of section II.A) the probabilities expressed by
the state at time t2 in equation (2), –q = 1 with prob-
ability 1/2 and q = 2 with probability 1/2– with the
assertion that the the observer O assigns the value q = 1
to the variable q at the same time t2. As Butterfield em-
phasizes, if this value assignment coexists with the prob-
ability distribution expressed by (2), then the eigenstate-
eigenvalue link must be in some sense weakened, and the
possibility of assigning values to variables in addition to
the eigenstate case (extra values) allowed. The second
and the third strategy in Butterfield’s classification dif-
fer on whether these extra values are “wholly a matter
of physics” (Physics Values), or are “somehow mental or
perspectival” (Perspectival Values). In the first case, the
assignment is (in every sense) observer-independent. In
the second case, it is (in some sense) observer-dependent.
§Note added. I have recently become aware of an idea to
circumvent this problem by exploiting the infinite-number-
of-degrees-of-freedom nature of the observing system. This
could generate an apparently non-linear evolution from con-
ventional Schro¨dinger evolution, via a symmetry-breaking in-
stability generating effective superselection rules. See in par-
ticular [Jona-Lasinio et. al. 81, 86] and [Wightman 95].
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A prime example of the second strategy (Physics Val-
ues) is Bohr’s, or Copenhagen, interpretation –at least
in one possible reading. Bohr assumes a classical world.
In Bohr’s view, this classical world is physically distinct
from the microsystems described by quantum mechan-
ics, and it is precisely the classical nature of the appara-
tus that gives measurement interactions a special status
[Bohr 1949; for a clear discussion of this point, see Lan-
dau Lifshitz 1977].
Within the point of view developed in this paper, one
can fix once and for all a privileged system So as “The
Observer” (capitalized). This system So can be formed
for instance by all the macroscopic objects around us. In
this way we recover Bohr’s view. The quantum mechan-
ical “state” of a system S is then the information that
the privileged system So has about S. Bohr’s choice is
simply the assumption of a set of systems (the classical
systems) as privileged observers. This is consistent with
the view presented here.∗∗ By taking Bohr’s step, one
becomes blind to the net of interrelations that are at the
foundation of the theory, and puzzled about the fact that
the theory treats one system, So, the classical world, in
a way which is different from the other systems. The
disturbing aspect of Bohr’s view is the inapplicability of
quantum theory to macrophysics. This disturbing aspect
vanishes, I believe, at the light of the discussion in this
paper.
Therefore, the considerations in this paper do not sug-
gest any modification to the conventional use of quantum
mechanics: there is nothing incorrect in fixing the pre-
ferred observer So once and for all. If we adopt the point
of view suggested here, we continue to use quantum me-
chanics precisely as is it is currently used. On the other
hand, this point of view (I hope) brings clarity about the
physical significance of the strange theoretical procedure
adopted in Bohr’s quantum mechanics: treating a por-
tion of the world in a different manner than the rest of
it. This different treatment is, I believe, the origin of the
unease with quantum mechanics.
The strident aspect of Bohr’s quantum mechanics is
cleanly characterized by von Neumann’s introduction of
the “projection postulate”, according to which systems
have two different kinds of evolutions: the unitary and
deterministic Schro¨dinger evolution, and the instanta-
∗∗A separate problem is why the observing system chosen
–So, or the macroscopic world– admits, in turn, a description
in which expectations probabilities evolve classically, namely
are virtually always concentrated on values 0 and 1, and in-
terference terms are invisible. It is to this question that the
physical decoherence mechanism [Joos Zeh 1985, Zurek 1981]
provides an answer. Namely, after having an answer on what
determines extra- values ascriptions (the observer-observed
structure, in the view proposed here), the physical decoher-
ence mechanism helps explaining why those ascriptions are
consistent with classical physics in macroscopic systems.
neous, probabilistic measurement collapse [von Neumann
1932]. According to the point of view described here, the
Schro¨dinger unitary evolution of the system S breaks
down simply because the system interacts with some-
thing which is not taken into account by the evolution
equations. Unitary evolution requires the system to be
isolated, which is exactly what ceases to be true dur-
ing the measurement, because of the interaction with
the observer. If we include the observer into the sys-
tem, then the evolution is still unitary, but we are now
dealing with the description of a different observer. As
suggested by Ashtekar, the point of view presented here
can then be described as a fundamental assumption pro-
hibiting an observer to be able to give a full description of
“itself” [Ashtekar 1993]. In this respect, these ideas are
related to earlier suggestions that quantum mechanics
is a theory that necessarily excludes the observer [Peres
and Zurek 1982, Roessler 1987, Finkelstein 1988, Primas
1990]. A recent result in this regard is a general theo-
rem proven by Breuer [Breuer 1994], according to which
no system (quantum nor classical) can perform a com-
plete self-measurement. The relation between the point
of view presented here and Breuer’s result deserves to be
explored.
Other views within Butterfield’s second strategy
(Physical Values) are Bohm’s hidden variables theory,
which violates hypothesis 2 (completeness), and modal
interpretations, which deny the collapse but assume the
existence of physical quantities’ values. Of these, I am
familiar with [van Fraassen 1991], or the idea of actual-
ization of potentialities in [Shimony 1969, Fleming 1992].
The assumed values must be consistent with the stan-
dard theory’s predictions, be probabilistically determined
by a unitary evolving wave function, but they are not
constrained by the eigenstate-eigenvalue link. One may
doubt these acrobatics could work [See Bacciagaluppi
1995, Bacciagaluppi and Hemmo 1995]. I am very sympa-
thetic with the idea that the object of quantum mechan-
ics is a set of quantities’ values and their distribution.
Here, I have assumed value assignment as in these inter-
pretations, but with two crucial differences. First, this
value assignment is observer-dependent. Second, it need
not be consistent with a unitary Schro¨dinger evolution,
because the evolution is not unitary when the observed
system interacts with the observer. Namely, there is col-
lapse in each observer-dependent evolution of expected
probabilities. These two differences allow values to be
assigned to physical quantities without any of the con-
sistency worries that plague modal interpretations. The
point is that the break of the eigenstate-eigenvalue link
is bypassed by that fact that the eigenvalue refers to one
observer, and the state to a different observer. For a fixed
observer, the eigenstate-eigenvalue link is maintained.
Consistency should only be recovered between different
observers, but consistency is only quantum mechanical
as discussed in section III.D. Actuality is observer de-
pendent. The fact that the values of physical quantities
are relational and their consistency is only probabilisti-
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cally required circumvents the potential difficulties of the
modal interpretations.
A class of interpretations of quantum mechanics that
Butterfield does not include in his classification, but
which are presently very popular among physicists, is the
consistent histories (CH) interpretations [Griffiths 1984,
Omnes 1988, Gell-Mann and Hartle 1990]. These inter-
pretations reduce the description of a system to the pre-
diction of temporal sequences of values of physical vari-
ables. The key novelties are three: (i) probabilities are
assigned to sequences of values, as opposed to single val-
ues; (ii) only certain sequences can be considered; (iii)
probability is interpreted as probability of the given se-
quence of values within a chosen family of sequences, or
framework. The restriction (ii) incorporates the quan-
tum mechanical prohibition of giving value, say, to posi-
tion and momentum at the same time. More precisely,
in combination with (iii) it excludes all the instances in
which observable interference effects would make proba-
bility assignments inconsistent. In a sense, CH represent
a sophisticated implementation of the program of dis-
covering a minimum consistent value attribution scheme.
The price paid for consistency is that a single value at-
tribution is meaningless: whether or not a variable has a
value may very well depend on whether we are asking or
not if at a later time another variable has a value.
There is a key subtlety in the CH scheme that has
rarely being emphasized††: this is the distinction between
“properties that hold with probability one” and “data”.
The interesting question to ask is: What is it that de-
termines which frameworks are allowed? The standard
answer in CH is that we have certain information on the
system, call it data. In particular, we know that cer-
tain physical quantities of the system have certain val-
ues. The fact that certain quantities have certain values
determines which framework are allowed to describe a
phenomenon. Thus: we rely on quantities having val-
ues (data) for selecting the allowed framework . Then we
derive probabilistic predictions about value attribution.
These probabilistic predictions are framework dependent.
It is often stated that in CH all value attributions are
framework dependent; this is the way Nature is. But if
all value attributions are framework dependent, what are
the data? In CH there seem to be two distinct kind of
value attributions: a weak value attribution: the frame-
work dependent values, and a strong value attribution:
the data, or facts. In CH the focus is totally on predic-
tions about weak value attributions. But everyday life
and scientific practice are about (possibly probabilistic)
predictions of facts, namely facts that could be later used
as data. To put it pictorially (and a bit imprecisely): I do
not care about a science that tells me that my airplane
will not crash “in one framework”; I want a science that
††The only discussion on this point I heard was by Isham.
will tell me that my airplane will just not crash!
Consider the following situation (situation A): a set
(D) of data on a system is given. From these data, it fol-
lows that there is a framework (call it F1) in which the
question “Is Q equal to 1 at time t?” can be asked, and
the answer is yes with probability one. Then consider the
following other situation (situation B): we have a set of
data on the system, which consist in the set (D) plus the
data that Q = 1 at time t . Is situation A physically the
same as situation B in the consistent histories approach?
The answer is no. In fact, situation A still allows for
Q = 2 (strange but true) in a different framework, say
F2, while situation B is incompatible withQ = 2, because
F2 is not an admitted framework. Therefore there should
exist a physical way in which we pass from situation A
to situation B . Namely there should be way for a prob-
ability 1 prediction (in a framework) to become a data.
The key question that, as far as I can see, the consis-
tent histories approaches does not address is: how do we
concretely pass (in a lab) from situation A to situation
B? What is it that transforms a probability-one event
(framework dependent) into something that we can use
as data (framework independent)? If the transformation
of a “probability-one-in-a-framework” situation into data
is an actual occurrence in Nature, then I believe CH fails
to tell me how this can happen (when does a framework
becomes realized as data). If, on the other hand, what
is data for me may fail to be data for somebody other,
then one falls precisely into the scheme presented in this
paper.
In the Copenhagen view, it is the interaction with a
classical object that actualizes properties. A different so-
lution has been suggested in this paper: interaction with
any object, but then actualization of properties is only
relative to that object. I do not see the solution of this
problem within the history views. This is not to say that
there is anything wrong in the CH approaches. To the
opposite, I believe that the CH views are correct and
precise. Still, there is a question that they leave open:
the physical meaning of the framework dependence of
the value assignments; more precisely, the understanding
of how there can be facts, or data, if property ascrip-
tions are only framework dependent. I think that the
answer is simply that there are no (observer indepen-
dent) data at all: the data that I have, and therefore
the family of frameworks that I can use is different from
your data, and therefore the family of framework that
you can use. The histories interpretations are not incon-
sistent with the analysis developed here. What I try to
add here is attention to the process through which the
observer-independent, but framework-dependent proba-
bilities attached to histories, may be related to actual
observer-dependent descriptions of the facts of the world.
Finally, let me come to the third strategy (Perspecti-
val Values), whose prime example is the many worlds in-
terpretation [Everett 1957, Wheeler 1957, DeWitt 1970],
and its variants. If the “branching” of the wave func-
tion in the many worlds interpretation is considered as a
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physical process, it raises the very same sort of difficulties
as the von Neumann “collapse” does. When does it hap-
pen? Which systems are measuring systems that make
the world branch? These difficulties of the many-world
interpretation have been discussed in the literature [See
Earman 1986]. Alternatively, we may forget branching as
a physical process, and keep evolving the wave function
under unitary evolution. The problem is then to interpret
the observation of the “internal” observers. As discussed
in [Butterfield 1985] and [Albert 1992], this can be done
by giving preferred status to special observers (appara-
tus) whose values determine a (perspectival) branching.
See Objection 7 in section II.B. A variant is to take brains
–“Minds”– as the preferred systems that determine this
perspectival branching, and thus whose state determines
the new “dimension” of indexicality. Preferred appara-
tus, or bringing Minds into the game, violates hypothesis
1.
There is a way of having (perspectival) branching keep-
ing all systems on the same footing: the way followed in
this paper, namely to assume that all values assignments
are completely relational, not just relational with respect
to apparatus or Minds. Notice, however, that from this
perspective Everett’s wave function is a very misleading
notion, not only because it represents the perspective of
a non-existent observer, but because it even fails to con-
tain any relevant information about the values observed
by each single observer! There is no description of the
universe in-toto, only a quantum-interrelated net of par-
tial descriptions.
With respect to Butterfield’s classification, the inter-
pretation proposed here is thus in the second, as well as in
the third, group: the extra values assigned are “somehow
perspectival” (but definitely not mental!), in that they
are observer-dependent, but at the same time “wholly
a matter of physics”, in the sense in which the “per-
spectival” aspect of simultaneity is “wholly a matter of
physics” in relativity. In one word: value assignment in
a measurement is not inconsistent with unitary evolution
of the apparatus+system ensemble, because value assign-
ment refers to the properties of the system with respect
to the apparatus, while the unitary evolution refers to
properties with respect to an external system.
From the point of view discussed here, Bohr’s interpre-
tation, consistent histories interpretations, as well as the
many worlds interpretation, are all correct. The point of
view closest to the one presented here is perhaps Heisen-
berg’s. Heisenberg’s insistence on the fact that the les-
son to be taken from the atomic experiments is that we
should stop thinking of the “state of the system”, has
been obscured by the subsequent terse definition of the
theory in terms of states given by Dirac. Here, I have
taken Heisenberg’s lesson to extreme consequences.‡‡
‡‡With a large number of exceptions, most physicists hold
Crane is developing a point of view similar to the one
discussed here and has attempted an ambitious extension
of these ideas to the cosmological general-covariant grav-
itational case [Crane 1995]. It was recently brought to
my attention that Zurek ends his paper [Zurek 1982] with
conclusions that are identical to the ones developed here:
“Properties of quantum systems have no absolute mean-
ing. Rather, they must be always characterized with re-
spect to other physical systems” and “correlations be-
tween the properties of quantum systems are more basic
that the properties themselves” [Zurek 1982]. Finally,
Rob Clifton has brought to my attention an unpublished
preprint by Kochen [Kochen 1979], with ideas extremely
similar to the ones presented here.
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